Response to “Even the Demons (Part 2)

Introduction

Read the original article here

In this article, I want to focus closely on one section of Drew’s series because it addresses a subject at the very heart of biblical interpretation—hermeneutics. How we read and interpret the Bible matters. Drew appeals to the analogia Scripturae—the principle that Scripture interprets Scripture and that clear passages should interpret the unclear. This is a principle I affirm wholeheartedly.

However, as I worked through his argument, I noticed several key fallacies and inconsistencies in how he applies this principle. Most importantly, Drew uses a type of reasoning in the elohim debate that we would never accept in other theological discussions—such as Calvinism vs. Arminianism. In defending Calvinism, we do not simply declare the passage that fits our position “clear” and the other “unclear” without first proving it from the text. Yet that is exactly what happens here. This approach stacks the deck in favor of the conclusion before the exegetical work is done.

What follows is an interaction with Drew’s own words, showing where clarity is being assumed rather than demonstrated, where key terms are left undefined, and where significant scholarly work is ignored. My goal is not to score points but to encourage a consistent, text-driven application of the analogia Scripturae—one that lets Scripture, not our theology, determine which passages speak with the greatest clarity.

1. Assuming Clarity to Win the Argument

Drew begins by rightly affirming the analogia Scripturae. He even uses the Calvinism debate as an example: Calvinists often treat John 10:15 (“I lay down my life for my sheep”) as the clear text and interpret 1 Tim. 2:6 (“a ransom for all”) in that light. But this example actually undermines his later argument. Non-Calvinists reverse the process, taking 1 Tim. 2:6 as clear and reading John 10:15 accordingly.

The lesson is obvious: the clarity of a passage can’t be determined simply by whether it supports our theological system. It must be established by the amount of information it gives, its context, and its precision in addressing the question at hand.

When Drew turns to the elohim debate, however, he doesn’t follow this rule. He labels “monotheistic” texts like 1 Tim. 2:5 and Isa. 45:5 as the “clear” ones and treats passages like Psalm 95:3 (“Yahweh… a great King above all gods”) as unclear. But he never proves that “one God” means “no other spiritual beings exist.” That is the very question under discussion.

If we decide clarity before doing the exegesis, we are no longer applying the analogia Scripturae—we are using it to confirm our own conclusions.

2. Misrepresentation and Conflation

Drew also conflates very different groups of interpreters. He lumps together critical scholars, Old Testament scholars, and Reformed evangelicals who affirm the existence of other elohim, as if they share the same methodology and theological commitments. But similar observations do not mean identical reasoning. Critical scholars often reject harmonization because they see the Old Testament as containing contradictory theologies. By contrast, I affirm harmonization—understanding “monotheistic” texts as affirmations of Yahweh’s unrivaled supremacy, not denials of the existence of other divine beings.

Conflating these groups blurs important distinctions, misrepresents my position, and undermines the precision needed for a fair theological debate.

3. Circular Labeling of “Clear” and “Unclear”

A recurring issue in Drew’s argument is the circular labeling of certain texts as “clear” and others as “unclear” without proving those judgments from the biblical text. Whether so-called “monotheistic” verses are ontological denials or comparative claims must be demonstrated from exegesis. Calling them “clear” from the outset smuggles in a theological conclusion as if it were a starting point.

This circularity creates a false dichotomy:

1. Deny the existence of other gods, or

2. Embrace contradictory theologies.

There is a third option—affirm that other spiritual beings exist while maintaining Yahweh’s incomparability. This reconciles the texts without contradiction, but Drew never considers it.

4. Misrepresentation of My Use of Nathan MacDonald

Drew writes, “Moffitt actually cites Nathan MacDonald approvingly when MacDonald claims that ‘monotheism’ is merely a seventeenth-century term.” This is not what I said. I never argued that “monotheism” is merely a seventeenth-century term, nor did I cite that fact as a reason to reject the concept. In the article he references, I clearly state that this is when the English form entered usage—but I also emphasize that our definition must come from Scripture itself, not from later philosophical categories. By isolating this historical note and ignoring my stated argument, Drew distorts both my meaning and my method.

5. Ignoring Existing Work on Divine vs. Angelic Natures

Drew claims that proponents of the “other gods” view have not met the challenge of defining the divine nature in contrast to an angelic nature. This is simply not true. Over the past two decades, multiple evangelical and Reformed authors—not just Michael Heiser—have given careful, detailed attention to this very question. For example, Craig Carter (Contemplating God with the Great Tradition, Baker Academic, 2021) and Meredith Kline (meredithkline.com) have articulated clear biblical and theological boundaries for divine nature that distinguish it from all creaturely natures. Doug Van Dorn and Matt Foreman (The Angel of the LORD, 2020) and Stephen F. Noll (Angels of Light, Powers of Darkness, 2003) have examined the nature and role of angelic beings, showing they do not share Yahweh’s incommunicable attributes. Gerald R. McDermott (God’s Rivals, 2007) has explored how these beings function in the biblical worldview without collapsing them into the Creator’s category. This body of work demonstrates that the challenge Drew presents has, in fact, been met repeatedly.

Drew does not have to agree with these conclusions, but to imply that this work has not been done is inaccurate. Ironically, while demanding others define divine nature, he never provides his own biblical definition of it. His section leans heavily on Thomistic metaphysics without showing from Scripture that this is how the biblical authors used the term elohim.

6. Misuse of Analogical Language

Drew argues that because biblical language is analogical, calling other beings elohim does not mean they are “real gods,” but rather points to their “power or majesty.” This argument fails for several reasons:

1. Wrong kind of comparison – Comparing elohim to calling believers “sheep” is mixing categories. “Sheep” is an obvious metaphor; elohim is a real category for beings in the unseen realm.

2. Not how the Bible uses the word – Elohim refers to God, angels, spirits, and demons in concrete ways (Psalm 82; 1 Sam. 28:13; Deut. 32:17), not as mere metaphors for power.

3. Assumes the meaning without proving it – Saying elohim just means “majestic” is an assertion, not a conclusion drawn from the texts.

4. Not every title is figurative – Context determines whether a term is metaphorical or ontological. Drew treats all elohim references as non-literal without textual proof.

5. Starts with the conclusion – He begins by denying these beings can be “real gods” and interprets all passages through that lens, rather than letting the passages define the term.

Conclusion

When discussing Calvinism, we instinctively know we cannot declare the passage that fits our theology “clear” and dismiss the other as “unclear” without first proving it. The same hermeneutical consistency should apply to the elohim debate.

The analogia Scripturae is a vital interpretive safeguard, but it only works if clarity is determined by careful exegesis, not theological preference. If we start with our conclusion and work backward, we are not protecting the unity of Scripture—we are using it selectively to confirm our own position.